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WRITTEN OPINIONS IN CASES AFFIRMED
BY THE APPELLATE COURT
In 1851, a wave of judicial reform was sweeping over the
country; and members of the Indiana Constitutional Convention
of that year caught the full force of that movement. There was
then, as there is now, antagonistic feeling toward our courts.
It was then felt they worked too much in the dark, and that their
decisions should be set forth in the full light of the day. In the
distrust of them, and as one of the reforms, juries in criminal
cases were given "the right to determine the law" applicable to
the facts involved, a most absurd provision which at the present
day they at times do not hesitate to wield. It was provided that
"The Supreme Court, upon the decision of every case, give a
statement in writing of each question arising in the record of
such case and the decisions of the court thereon."'
The Supreme Court soon felt the oppressiveness of this constitutional provision, and by construction narrowed its full force
in cases where a reversal took place, saying:
"When does a, question, in the sense of the Constitution, arise in the
record? We do not think it does so merely because it is raised by counsel,
nor because it is presented in the assignment of errors, nor necessarily
because it is cited in a bill of exceptions. It must be a question, the decision of which is necessary to the final determination of the cause; and
which the record presents with a fullness and distinctness rendering it
possible for the court to comprehend it in all its bearings. Hence, it has
been the frequent practice of this court, in cases where a single point
would put an end to a case, to decide that point and no other." 2

Under this decision if a single error requires a reversal of a
case, it is unnecessary to pass upon any other error, even though
sufficient to require a reversal; and this not infrequently occurs.
It is sufficient to pass upon the error requiring a reversal of
the case, and as to the remaining errors not passed upon, there
is no "decision." But as to each case affirmed, every "question
arising in the record of such case" must be decided and a reason
therefor given in writing.
This constitutional provision has no application to the Appellate Court. It is not required to give an opinion, either oral or
written, in cases it affirms; but in every case it reverses it must
give an opinion "on the material questions therein in writing." 3
1 R. S. 1926, Sec. 172.
2 WilettS v. Ridgeway, 9 Ind. 367.
3 R. S. 1926, Sec. 1361.
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A true construction of this provision requires a decision upon
every "material" question involved, even though a single erroneous "question" is sufficient to require a reversal.
How has the Appellate Court treated this statutory provision?
In the 84th Appellate Court Report, in which opinions were
prepared and filed, 73 of the cases were affirmed and 33 reversed.
In the 85th, 75 were affirmed and 59 reversed. In the 84th, 16
cases were affirmed without opinions and 4 with very short ones
printed in small type and inserted in the last pages of the volume. In the 85th, 33 cases were affirmed without opinions, and
8 reversed with very short ones, also inserted in the last pages
of the volume. In these two volumes we have 148 cases affirmed
with opinions and 92 reversed, also with opinions.
The opinions in the affirmed cases, with the syllabus, in the
84th volume, occupy 435 2 pages, the reversed cases 236. The
opinions in the affirmed cases in the 85th Volume occupy 378
pages, the reversed, 304. In the two volumes the opinions in
affirmed cases occupy 8131 pages, the reversed, 540.
It will thus be seen that in the two volumes opinions were
written and filed in 148 cases where there was no law requiring
4
it to be done.
These two volumes are fair samples of the other 83 volumes,
except more cases are now affirmed without opinions than formerly. In the early volumes scarcely a case is affirmed without
an opinion.
In the 84th Volume a dissenting opinion occupies 13 pages
and in the 85th, another, 6. But there are very few dissenting
opinions.
The question arises, why do the Appellate Court Judges
laboriously prepare opinions in practically all the cases, when
no statute, nor even a rule of practice, requires it? Occasionally
some of these opinions are 20 and 25 pages long. Is it a desire
to see one's self in print? A very compelling force it must be
admitted.
The preparation of an opinion is a laborious task. But it is
not essential to a correct decision. In nearly every case more
time is consumed in the writing of the opinion than is required
to examine the record, read the briefs and the authorities cited.
Many a case can be decided correctly by the court on the reading
of the briefs without an examination of the authorities; yet the
4 Cleveland R. R. Co. v. Van Natta, 44 Ind. App. 608, 87 N. E. 999, 88

N. E. 716.
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preparation of a written opinion calls for the citation of authorities. If the Appellate Court did not prepare opinions in all the
cases it affirms, it could dispose of three times the number it
handles, probably more, and as accurately as it does when it
prepares opinions in each one.
There is another more serious question. In opinions inaccuracies creep in. Not every judge can always accurately state
a legal proposition applicable to the facts involved in the case,
although his ultimate conclusion be correct. These inaccurate
expressions lead to confusion in the practice. This by all means
should be avoided. Then there is great danger in the clash between the Appellate and Supreme Court opinions, and yet the
case be accurately decided. Thus the profession find themselves
in doubt as to just what is the law of the state; for the Appellate
Court opinion is an interpretation of former Supreme Court
opinions. This leads to confusion in the law. And it is right
here that petitions are often filed for a review of the case by
the Supreme Court. These petitions are, unnecessarily, a great
burden on the Supreme Court, consume much of its time, with
little or no credit by the public for the labor.
No litigant, as of right, is entitled to ask for written opinions
unless some statute or constitutional provision expressly confer
it upon him. A nisi prius judge who gives no opinions is a
wise judge. The only persons having an interest in an affirned
case are the litigants, and they know what the case is about.
The public have no interest in their litigation. It is a personal
quarrel between the litigants. Then why should an opinion be
written telling them about their own differences, and the public
about it, and the opinion be published at the expense of the
state?
There are thousands of pages of opinions in the Appellate
Court reports affirming cases, occupying nearly two-thirds of
the 85 volumes. Thirty of these volumes are sufficient to contain
'all the opinions in the reversed cases. About 55 volumes could
have been dispensed with if no opinions in affirmed cases had
been filed. Formerly the Reporter was eager to publish as many
volumes as possible when he reaped a profit on each volume
sold; but now he receives no such profit. The publication of
these reports is at the expense of the state.
The multiplication of reports is a very serious thing for the
legal profession; and their publication ought to be restricted.
When the writer, in 1874, began reading law, there were 44 vol-
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umes of Supreme Court Reports, 8 Blackfords, and one Smith.
In the last fifty years the number of Indiana Reports has gone
up by leaps and bounds. In the English speaking world the
method of reporting opinions is bound to break down. It cannot
last. In 1916 (the writer has no more recent data) the number
in England, Ireland, Scotland, and in all the British colonial
countries, was 6,836; and in America, 9,621; a total of 16,457.
From 1885 to 1916, a period of thirty years, over 6,000 reports
were published, about 1,600 more volumes than had been published in America down to 1882.
So it stands us in hand to curtail the number of written opinions as much as reasonably possible. Cannot the Appellate Court
help us in this endeavor by not writing opinions in practically
all cases it affirms?
There is another phase of this question. Not all the cases
affirmed are of importance. Opinion after opinion simply reiterates well settled and accurately stated principles in hundreds,
even thousands, of cases. Often opinions contain lengthy quotations or paraphrases from former opinions. If opinions were
not written in those affirmed cases of minor character, involving
no new principles, and of only those of any importance, then
the judges would have more time to devote to important affirmed
cases, would write better opinions and shorter ones. A hurriedly
written opinion and one written under pressure for lack of time,
means the production of a longer opinion and often a "sloppy"
one. Let us hope there will be fewer opinions in affirmed cases,
and shorter ones.
W. W. THORNTON.
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